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Agreeing to Disagree:
Security Council Resolution 1441
and Intentional Ambiguity
Michael Byers
nited Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously on 8 November 2002, was initially celebrated as reflecting a newfound sense of unity and resolve among the Council's
fifteen members.' The Council recalled its previous resolutions on Iraq,
required the Iraqi government to account for all of its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and insisted on full cooperation with UN and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors-to
whom the Council accorded enhanced powers. 2 The Council also
declared that Iraq was in "material breach" of some of the previous resolutions, that any further failure to comply would constitute an additional material breach, that it would "convene immediately" if the
inspectors reported such a failure, and that continued violations of
Iraq's obligations would result in "serious consequences."
But deep differences soon emerged as to whether the text of the resolution authorized UN member states to use force to uphold its provisions. When the United States and the UK invaded Iraq in March 2003,
they claimed this action was authorized; France and Russia, in contrast,
maintained that no such authorization was present. The same divergence
of opinion was evident among many of the nonpermanent members of
the Council, the 176 UN member states not on the Council, and academic international lawyers. Today, the differences over Resolution
1441 are seen as reflecting a profound crisis for the UN and inter3
national peace and security more generally.
In this article, I examine in detail Resolution 1441: its background,
the text itself, and the debates that continue to rage. I question how,
after eight weeks of intense negotiations, the provisions of a five-page
document could be interpreted in such very different ways. I conclude
that the potential for dispute over the resolution was not an accident,
that the document contains intentional ambiguities-in other words, that
the Council members negotiated and agreed to language that they knew
could be used to support arguments on both sides.
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That said, all of the Council's members likely believed that their
particular understanding of the resolution was legally correct. The differing interpretations were not necessarily the result of bad legal advice.
They derived at least in part from subtle, preexisting differences in
interpretive approach-differences that only become significant in situations of textual ambiguity and that become all the more significant
when, as in the case of Resolution 1441, there is no international court
or tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve the resulting dispute.
The international lawyers who work for governments are aware of
these differing interpretive approaches and their potential effects. The
members of the Security Council agreed to the ambiguities of Resolution 1441 with their eyes open, knowing that they were neither resolving nor papering over their differences. Instead, they were simply agreeing to disagree.
Those states that opposed a U.S.-led war on Iraq had several possible motives for accepting these ambiguities. The most obvious was to
prevent, or at least postpone, a war. Another important but less obvious
motive derived from the fact that the ambiguities, by providing scope
for opposing legal positions, effectively "de-legalized" the situationthus giving free rein to international politics in a discrete situation
where the politics seemed destined to prevail. And this, in turn, helped
to protect the existing rules on the use of force from serious harm. In
the highly charged circumstances created by President George W.
Bush's clear and firm intent to remove Saddam Hussein from power,
Resolution 1441 was, at least for those who supported the UN and the
existing rules on the use of force, an exercise in legal damage control.
I begin by canvassing some previous manifestations of intentional
ambiguity in international law, before identifying the relevant ambiguities of Resolution 1441 and the key arguments associated with them.
I then consider some of the potential policy reasons why different
Council members negotiated and accepted a less than clear text. Finally,
I suggest several reasons why international lawyers have previously
paid little attention to the role of intentional ambiguity, including a perception that recognizing the existence of such ambiguities could undermine the ideal of a determinative, apolitical body of rules. But interdisciplinary work at the interface of international law and international
relations has shown that law both reflects and constrains politics and
power, and that acknowledging the political underpinnings of international law does not therefore negate the inherent specificity of its
rules. Moreover, some areas of international law are evidently more
politicized than others-the rules on the use of military force particularly so. Seen from this perspective, the adoption of an intentionally
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ambiguous Security Council resolution in the face of a threatening
political convulsion demonstrates a pragmatic awareness of the limits of
the law-coupled with a desire to preserve the rules for better days.

Intentional Ambiguity in International Lawmaking
Unintentional ambiguity in international legal documents is an almost
inevitable consequence of the character of negotiations, where delegates
frequently have to resolve complex issues and widely divergent interests under severe time constraints. But one should not underestimate the
frequency with which inconsistencies and ambiguities are intentionally
included. States that are unable to secure their desired outcome on a
particular negotiating issue may push for ambiguous language so as to
reduce the impact of their loss. Likewise, when more or less equally
balanced sets of negotiators find themselves in a stalemate, the adoption
of an ambiguous text allows all sides to claim victory-particularly
when reporting back to their home governments and national constituencies. It may also allow them to apply their own view when implementing the resulting obligations and to maintain their stance through to
further negotiations. As Richard Bilder has written, "Often agreement
on a particular matter will only be possible through the adoption of very
broad language in the text, which in effect leaves the problem for later
4
resolution."
The provision on compensation for the expropriation of foreignowned property in the 1974 Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of
States provides one example of intentional ambiguity, as Jorge Castafieda
explained:
La solution du problkme de l'indemnisation consisterait peut-8tre en
une formule qui pr6serverait la position que l'une et I'autre parties
soutiennent depuis pros d'un sicle, c'est- -dire qui serait 6nonc6e en
des termes suffisamment g6n6raux et suffisamment abstraits (je serais
les positions
tent6 de dire d6lib6r6ment ambigus) pour englober
5
respectives sans rien y changer et sans rien trancher.
The 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
provides another example. The negotiations, the impulse of which was
the 1976 Entebbe crisis, involved two very different concerns. 6 Developed states were worried about their own nationals being taken hostage
and wanted a treaty that provided maximum scope for their efforts to
address the issue, while imposing stringent cooperation requirements on
developing states. Developing states were more concerned about the
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possibility of military interventions directed at the (real or ostensible)
purpose of rescuing hostages. A compromise eventually emerged. Although the convention includes a general reaffirmation of the principles
of the UN Charter, it neither explicitly grants nor denies a right to use
force to rescue hostages on the territory of another state. 7 As Francis
Boyle explained,
This outcome ...essentially left the seminal question of the Entebbe
raid unanswered. . . . All members of the Hostages Committee
abstained from a revival of the Security Council debates on the legality of the Entebbe raid precisely in order to avert a breakdown of the
Committee proceedings. Instead, they operated on the foundation of
the least common denominator among them and drafted a hostages
8
convention on that compromise basis.
However, one should not assume that the adoption of an ambiguous
text leaves the balance of negotiating power unaltered: the mere act of
framing the dispute in writing might subsequently provide an advantage
to one side. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides
one example of how this could occur. Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS spells
out that "members may also exclude from patentability" the following:
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than
non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members
shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The
provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after
the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 9
The obvious nature of the contradiction, which leaves it frustratingly unclear as to whether states can exclude plants from patents and
comparable intellectual property protections, suggests that it was intentional. This suggestion is bolstered by the fact that the parties committed to further negotiations, not on the issue of plant patents as such, but
on the existing terms of the provision. And this in turn could have consequences for the outcome of those negotiations, which, instead of
being largely political, will now be couched in normative terms and
colored by the overall tenor, object, and purpose of the agreement. As
Richard Bilder has explained,
Simply having a written agreement may promote general attitudes and
establish an institutional framework and negotiating parameters in
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which a more genuine agreement can, over time, be more easily
achieved

....

This is particularly so where the only alternative is to

defer attempts to reach agreement to a future time when, as the context of negotiation changes, divergent interests become more apparent,
and positions harden and become more fixed, even equivocal agreement may be unattainable.' 0
In the case of Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS, the requirement that
"Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties" will be
buttressed by the fact that the treaty as a whole is directed at the worldwide implementation of stringent intellectual property rules, whereas
the preceding, contradictory sentence might well be undermined by that
same object and purpose. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude
that this particular ambiguity reflects a negotiating success for a group
of states seeking, through a strategic shaping of the bases for future
negotiations, to improve the prospects for a clear requirement of universal plant patentability. As for the states opposed to this outcome, it is
possible that they were aware of, and decided to accept, this potential
consequence of ambiguity, perhaps because this was the best provision
that they could achieve within the broader "package deal" of the WTO
agreement, or because the ambiguity at least preserves the possibility of
another outcome, should the interests of states or their relative bargaining power change.
Sometimes, the substance of provisions in documents that are
adopted in two or more official languages differs between the different
language versions. One example is Security Council Resolution 242,
which was adopted following the 1967 Six Day War. The French version demands the "retrait des forces arm6es isra6liennes des territoires
occupds"-which translates as the "retreat of Israeli armed forces from
the occupied territories." In contrast, the English version demands only
the retreat "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and thus
arguably does not apply to all the territory, that is, East Jerusalem, the
Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank." The inconsistency
was intentional, as Guy de Lacharri~re explained:
C'est ainsi que certains d616gu6s ont pr6cis6 qu'ils 6taient prets
accepter le texte seulement dans une des deux versions, la franqaise
pour les uns, l'anglaise pour les autres. Ainsi, l'ambiguit6 est apparue
comme une condition de l'adoption de la r6solution, la divergence des
vues ne pouvant atre autrement surmont6e.

L'ambigu't6, introduite et maintenue sur la demande tr~s pressante d'Israel, peut tre consid6r6e comme ayant &6, pour cet Etat, un
12
proc6d6 de limitation de '6chec.
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Much less frequently, but also intentionally, the same group of
states will simultaneously adopt two contradictory documents. An
example of this occurred with respect to the situation on the Korean
Peninsula in 1975. On one and the same day, the General Assembly
adopted two texts carrying the same number-3390 (XXX)-and identified as resolutions "A" and "B." Resolution A states that "the Armistice Agreement remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and
security in the area." Resolution B, in contrast, states that "a durable
peace cannot be expected so long as the present state of armistice is
3
kept as it is in Korea."'
These five examples demonstrate that intentional ambiguities are
part and parcel of international law, included in legal documents as and
where necessary, for a variety of reasons. It consequently comes as no
surprise to find similar ambiguities in Resolution 1441.

Intentional Ambiguity and Resolution 1441
A careful perusal of Resolution 1441 reveals grounds for arguments both
for and against the existence of a Security Council authorization for the
use of force against Iraq in 2003-and this in a document that resulted
from eight weeks of negotiations among governments that were working
hard either to secure or deny such authorization. The failure to close off
one or the other sets of arguments suggests that the ambiguities were
intentional and that the potential for deep disagreement over the legal
meaning of the document was consciously accepted at the time. 14
The argument in favor of an authorization was summarized as follows by the attorney general of the United Kingdom:
1. In resolution 678 [of 1990] the Security Council authorized force
against Iraq, to eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area.
2. In resolution 687 [of 1991], which set out the ceasefire conditions
after Operation Desert Storm, the Security Council imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruc-

tion in order to restore international peace and security in the area.
Resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use

force under resolution 678.
3. A material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use
force under resolution 678.
4. In resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq has been
and remains in material breach of resolution 687, because it has not
fully complied with its obligations to disarm under that resolution.
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5. The Security Council in resolution 1441 gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and warned Iraq
of the "serious consequences" if it did not.
6. The Security Council also decided in resolution 1441 that, if Iraq
failed at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of resolution 1441, that would constitute a further material breach.
7. It is plain that Iraq has failed to comply and therefore Iraq was at
the time of resolution 1441 and continues to be in material breach.
8. Thus, the authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived
and so continues today.
9. Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security Council to sanction force was required if that
had been intended. Thus, all that resolution 1441 requires is reportfailures, but
ing to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq's
5
not an express further decision to authorize force.'
The terms of Resolution 1441 favor this argument in a number of
ways. First, the preamble, by expressly referring to Resolution 678, provides support for the assertion that that particular resolution remains in
force. Second, although Resolution 1441 does not expressly authorize the
use of force, it does expressly adopt the language of "material breach" in
a situation where all the members of the Security Council were without
doubt as to what the United States and the UK understood that concept
to imply-namely, that fundamental failures to comply with Resolutions
687 and 1441 would revive the authorization provided in Resolution
678.16 Third, although Resolution 1441 requires that the Council convene "to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all
of the relevant council resolutions in order to secure international peace
and security," it does not expressly state that further action requires a
new resolution. This omission enabled the British government to argue:
Had that been the intention, it would have provided that the Council
would decide what needed to be done to restore international peace
and security, not that it would consider the matter. The choice of
words was deliberate; a proposal that there should be a requirement
for a decision by the Council, a17position maintained by several Council members, was not adopted.
Other aspects of Resolution 1441, however, favor the argument
against authorization, which may be summarized as follows:
1. Resolution 687 (read in conjunction with Resolution 686) terminated the authorization to use force that the Security Council had provided
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in resolution 678: any further use of force would thus require a new
authorization. This was made particularly clear in the concluding paragraph of Resolution 687, which states that the Council: "Decides to
remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be
required for the implementation of the resolution and to secure peace
and security in the area."
2. To the degree that Resolution 687 constituted a cease-fire agreement, the agreement was between the Security Council and Iraq
(although the cease-fire itself applied to Iraq and the "coalition states").
A "material breach" could not revive the right of the coalition states to
use force because they were not party to the agreement.
3. Although Resolution 1441 finds Iraq in material breach (and
asserts that a further violation will constitute a further material breach),
it at no point specifies any legal consequence of this finding.
4. Resolution 1441 does not contain the signal words "use all necessary means," which have traditionally been considered vital to any
Security Council authorization.
5. Following its adoption, representatives of all the members of the
Security Council, including the United States and Britain, publicly confirmed that Resolution 1441 provided no "automaticity" for the use of
force. 18
The terms of Resolution 1441 favor this argument in a number of
ways. First, the reference to Resolution 678 is made in the context of
"recalling" previous resolutions and is not therefore easily understood
as an assertion that the resolution remains in force. Second, Resolution
1441 conspicuously fails to specify the legal consequences, if any, of a
finding of material breach, despite the fact that this concept is not an
established part of United Nations law. 19 Third, Resolution 1441 does
state that, in the event of a report of noncompliance from the UN or the
IAEA inspectors, the Council "will convene immediately.., in order to
consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the
relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and
security." Fourth, although the Council warns of "serious consequences," it does not, again, employ the words "use all necessary
means." Finally, the Council declares its decision "to remain seized of
20
the matter."
A more detailed analysis of the respective arguments would delve
into the context and origins of Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441, the
practice of the Security Council and its member states from 1990
onward, and the views expressed by two successive UN secretariesgeneral. However, my point is not that one full set of arguments is better

Michael Byers

173

than the other-good international lawyers can and will argue about the
legality of the Iraq war for decades to come-but rather that both sets of
arguments are at least plausible. And that the plausibility of each is
maintained by ambiguities in Resolution 1441 that were almost certainly intended by, or at least evident to, all of the Council's members.
Further evidence of the intentional character of the ambiguities
appeared after the Iraq war began. For example, in May 2003, the
Financial Times reported that, in late February 2003, Jean-David
Levitte, the French ambassador to Washington, met with U.S. deputy
national security adviser Stephen Hadley to discuss British and U.S.
efforts to secure a "second resolution." According to the Financial
Times, "Mr. Levitte urged Mr. Hadley to drop the second resolution. It
would, he warned, cause unnecessary diplomatic damage. If they went
to war without another resolution, its legality would be hazy, whereas if
they went for it and failed, the legality would be in no doubt." 21 Levitte
was reportedly acting on direct instructions from President Jacques
Chirac.2 2 James P. Rubin has reported that Levitte also met with VicePresident Richard Cheney. According to Rubin,
France's ambassador in Washington, Jean-David Levitte, told Cheney
in February that Washington and Paris should simply "agree to disagree." Through other diplomatic channels, the French advised the
Americans to bypass the council entirely. "Your interpretation [of
1441] is sufficient [to justify war]," they counseled Washington, and
"you should rely on your interpretation. '23

Potential Policy Reasons for the Intentional Ambiguities
Each of the fifteen members of the Security Council would have had its
own, often complex combination of reasons for agreeing to the ambiguities of Resolution 1441. For example, London was acutely conscious of
its own public's skepticism with respect to the degree and imminence of
the threat posed by Iraq and to Prime Minister Tony Blair's unwavering support for President George Bush's policies. 24 A credible argument
based on Security Council resolutions would allay some of that skepticism by providing the apparent imprimatur of international law and thus
of a greater degree of multilateral legitimacy. The British government
mishandled other aspects of the situation, releasing dossiers on Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction that were later revealed to be plagiarized
or otherwise suspect, 25 and pushing for the "second" Security Council
resolution that in the end could not be achieved. 26 Yet the ambiguities of
Resolution 1441 provided an essential fallback: despite its various public
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relations problems-including a nasty spat with France-the government could at least show that the use of force was not demonstrably illegal. And this, the polls indicated, mattered greatly to British voters. 27
The U.S. government also had an interest in securing the apparent
imprimatur of multilateral legitimacy. In the autumn of 2002, a majority of Americans wanted the Bush administration to pursue the Iraq matter through the UN. 28 And while many within that majority might well
have been satisfied simply with an effort to secure UN backing, the
need to retain London's support provided a strong incentive for a positive negotiating result. 29 Blair provided the administration with
enhanced credibility-polling higher in the United States than the president himself and providing a more articulate voice in favor of war. 30
Although the American public did not seem particularly concerned as to
whether the war was permissible under international law, it did need
convincing that the war was necessary. 31 Blair's continued support and
32
advocacy may have been decisive.
Paris and Moscow both had significant financial incentives for preventing war, given the substantial debts owed them by Iraq. 33 Their
agreement to Resolution 1441 was consistent with this interest, in that
the resolution provided for the resumption of weapons inspections,
which in turn postponed the war and raised the possibility, however
slight, of full Iraqi compliance. Yet the French and Russians would also
have been thinking of other consequences of war, including its possible
effects on the existing international order. 34 Their concern would have
been heightened by President Bush's 1 June 2002 claim to an extended
right of preemptive self-defense, 35 as subsequently fleshed out in the
National Security Strategy of the United States of America on 20 September 2002.36 And it would have reached fever pitch as a result of the
threat, made explicit in Bush's address to the General Assembly on September 12, that the world organization would be rendered irrelevant if
no Security Council resolution was achieved. 37 Both governments were
aware that a U.S. and British-led war against Iraq that was justified
solely on the basis of self-defense against a developing (as opposed to
truly imminent) threat could have modified customary international law
(if the action was widely supported) or at least, by demonstrating the
willingness of two traditionally strong supporters of international law to
stretch the rules, thus could have undermined the rule of law in international peace and security. 38 In either case, the central role of the Security Council, and with it the importance of France and Russia as vetoholding permanent members, would have been significantly diminished.
Both states therefore had a strong incentive to cushion the impact of any
such war on the existing rules and institutions governing the use of
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force, even if that meant providing the United States and Britain with a
more credible legal justification.
China, although not a major creditor of Iraq, would have made calculations similar to those of France and Russia, as would many of the
nonpermanent members. 39 Some, such as Syria, while vehemently
opposed to a war in Iraq, would also have been very concerned to avoid
displeasing the reigning superpower. 40 Resolution 1441 enabled them to
placate the United States without visibly giving in to its demands. The
end result was that the intentional ambiguities of the resolution served
the interests of all the members of the Security Council by providing a
plausible justification for the war while maintaining legal arguments in
opposition.

Disputed Foundations:
The Law and Politics of Interpretation
Most international lawyers regard the law through an adjudicative
prism.'And courts and tribunals must render a clear decision on the
arguments presented to them; they are not, in legal terminology, allowed
to render a non liquet.4 1 International lawyers therefore tend to believe
that there is always a "right answer" and that all that it takes to find the
answer is a rigorous assessment of the "sources" of international law.
These sources, as famously set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, include treaties; customary international
law (made up of state practice and the legal opinions of states); general
principles of law; and, on a subsidiary basis, the decisions of courts and
the views of academics. 42 Today, the sources also include, at a minimum, those Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of
43
the UN Charter and thereby endowed with binding legal force.
Where gaps exist, either in the source material or in the application
of that material to a specific dispute, international lawyers seek to fill
them through analogical reasoning from related precedents, rules, or
principles. 44 But the analogies chosen, or indeed the relative weight
accorded to different source materials, remain somewhat discretionary
and, as a result, different international lawyers sometimes assess the
sources in slightly different ways. 45 Nowhere is the impact of such subtle differences in approaches to the sources more apparent than with
respect to the debates over Resolution 1441.
Although the various members of the Security Council would have
been aware that the ambiguities of Resolution 1441 provided room for
arguments both for and against the existence of an authorization to use
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force, they still likely believed that their particular understanding of
resolution was legally correct. As compared to most other countries,
United States in recent decades has tended to place more weight on
"object and purpose" of international documents and less weight

the
the
the
on
their actual terms. The most famous manifestation of this tendency
occurred at the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,
when the U.S. delegation proposed a purposive approach to interpretation that would have emphasized a comprehensive examination of the
context of the treaty aimed at ascertaining the common will of the parties-as that will evolved over time. 46 The proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by the other delegations: Article 31 (1) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that "a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." 47 As important, Article 32 restricts consideration of
the "preparatory work of the treaty ... to determine the meaning" to
situations when "the interpretation according to article 31" has left
the meaning "ambiguous or obscure" or led to a result "which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 48 In other words, preparatory documents
and records of negotiations cannot generally be used for interpretive
purposes.
Notwithstanding Articles 31 and 32, the United States still tends to
prefer a more contingently purposive and less textually oriented
approach, most notably with respect to the UN Charter. One of the more
extreme examples of this arose during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, as Rubin
explained:
There was a series of strained telephone calls between [U.S. Secretary
of State Madeleine] Albright and [UK Foreign Secretary Robin] Cook,
in which he cited problems "with our lawyers" over using force in the
absence of UN endorsement. "Get new lawyers," she suggested. But
with a push from Prime Minister Tony Blair, the British finally agreed
that UN Security Council approval was not legally required. 49
Unlike the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions are not
treaties. They resemble executive orders more than contracts, and the
interpretive rules that apply to them might therefore be somewhat different. One of the very few authoritative guides to their interpretation is
the following passage from the International Court of Justice's 1971
Namibia Advisory Opinion: "The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed ... having regard to the terms
of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the
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Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might
assist in determining the legal consequences." 50 Unfortunately, the court
did not specify any priority among, or the relative weight of, the various
indicia.
Relatively little academic writing has been directed to this issueperhaps because the Security Council was blocked for most of the Cold
War-and those who have written favor approaches that differ markedly
from each other. Michael Wood, the current UK foreign office legal
adviser, has advanced a position that takes into account the full background of the Council's involvement with an issue so as to determine
the purpose the Council was seeking to achieve:
a. The aim of interpretation should be-to adapt Lord McNair on
treaties-to give effect to the intention of the Council as expressed
by the words used by the Council in the light of the surrounding
circumstances.
b. The interpreter will, even if this is not expressly stated, seek to apply
the general principles of interpretation as they have been elaborated
in relation to treaties. The interpreter is likely to turn to the rules in
articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention, especially the general rule
in article 31.1 and the supplementary means referred to in article 32.
c. But caution is required. SCRs [Security Council resolutions] are not
treaties: indeed the differences are very great. Nor are SCRs necessarily all of the same nature. SCRs must be interpreted in the context of the United Nations Charter. It becomes highly artificial, and
indeed to some extent is simply not possible, to seek to apply all the
Vienna Convention rules mutatis mutandis to SCRs.
d. In the case of SCRs, given their essentially political nature and the
way they are drafted, the circumstances of the adoption of the resolution and such preparatory work as exists may often be of greater
significance than in the case of treaties. The Vienna Convention distinction between the general rule and the supplementary means has
even less significance than in the case of treaties. In general, less
importance should attach to the minutiae of language. And there 5is1
considerable scope for authentic interpretation by the Council itself.
Such a purposive approach leads relatively easily to a presumption
in favor of an authorization to use force when a resolution is adopted
in a situation where (1) the Council has previously identified a threat to
international peace and security, (2) the Council has imposed strict conditions on the state posing the threat, and (3) that state has conspicuously failed to fulfill the entirety of those conditions. Although the presumption may be countered by clear evidence to the contrary, textual
ambiguities are read, where possible, in a manner that is consistent with
the view that the Council intends its demands to be complied with and,
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if necessary, enforced. It will already be apparent that this was the
approach used by Washington and London to interpret Resolution 1441.
In contrast, Jochen Abr. Frowein, the recently retired director of the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law, has advocated an interpretive approach that is more restrictive
than that applied to treaties. He begins by discounting the relevance of
the subjective intentions of Security Council members:
The resolution is not based on the common will of all those concerned. It is based on the common will of the majority of the members
of the Security Council, including the permanent members, at least by
abstention. This means that States against whom the Security Council
exercises its power under Chapter VII have not contributed to the formulation of the resolution. As far as they are concerned the resolution
has the same sort of objective existence as laws or administrative acts
in a specific legal system. Therefore, the objective view of the neutral
observer as addressee must be the most important aspect for the interpretation. Subjective intentions of some members of the Security
Council, particularly intentions covered by the formulation or hidden
in specific wording can, at least in principle, not be seen as in any way
decisive. 52
Frowein then suggests that the nonparticipation of the addressees of
Council resolutions requires the reactivation, in this context, of a venerable presumption:
An old rule of interpretation of international treaties, frequently
invoked before the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was the
rule according to which treaties must be interpreted as respecting
the sovereignty of States as far as possible. The idea behind that rule
was that States may not be presumed to have given up their sovereign
rights in a treaty. The Vienna Convention did not include such a rule.
In fact, the International Law Commission was of the opinion that the
starting point must always be the intention of the parties as expressed
by the specific language of the treaty. This is in line with the nature
of a treaty as an instrument in which the consensus among the parties
has been expressed.
It is quite different with Security Council resolutions, particularly
from the point of view of the state against whom enforcement measures are being taken. Such a resolution is the legal basis for the most
severe encroachment upon the sovereignty of a member of the United
Nations. It is submitted, therefore, that for the interpretation of such a
resolution the old rule according to which limitations of sovereignty
may not be lightly assumed is fully justified. Only where the use of
force against a sovereign state is clearly authorized by a resolution this
is [sic] in fact lawful under United Nations law. 53
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The presumption, it should be noted, is a specific application of the
more general "Lotus principle": that restrictions on the freedom of
54
states cannot be presumed.
The disagreement over Resolution 1441 indicates that many countries subscribe to the more textually oriented approach advanced by
Frowein. Such an approach, modeled on Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, essentially considers that the Council only means what it specifically says. There is, consequently, an interpretive presumption against the authorization of military force. This
presumption is consistent with a related view that exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force set out in Article 2(4) of the UN
55
Charter should be interpreted narrowly.
Although my own preference is for the more restrictive of these two
interpretive approaches, it must be acknowledged that the coexistence
of the two approaches and their consequent presumptions makes it possible for an ambiguous resolution to mean very different things to different states. The adoption of differing interpretations of Resolution
1441 was, again, probably less the result of bad legal advice or a cynical distorting of the law than it was of the application of different interpretive approaches to a situation of textual ambiguity.
The relative lack of writing on the issue of interpreting Security
Council resolutions suggests that this is an underdeveloped area of customary international law that has itself remained somewhat ambiguous-to the point that differing approaches could be employed without
this in itself clearly violating the law. From a legal perspective, one of
the more interesting aspects of the war in Iraq is that this debate has
become fully engaged. The respective positions are now clear, and in
one prominent instance a number of countries have had to take sides.
But single crises-and the state practices associated with them-do not
generally make or change customary international law; what matters
instead is the behavior of states over time. For the moment, all that can
be conclusively said is that there was a sufficient absence of agreement
over the interpretation of Resolution 1441 to indicate that the interpretive approach preferred by the United States and the United Kingdom
has not yet become legally required. At the same time, those two countries may have succeeded in maintaining or perhaps even extending
what might be called the "sphere of plausibility" with regard to arguments on this issue. As Sir Arthur Watts has posited,
There is room for the view that all that States need for the general
purposes of conducting their international relations is to be able to
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advance a legal justification for their conduct which is not demonstrably rubbish. Thereafter, political factors can take over, and the international acceptability or otherwise of a State's conduct can be left to
be determined by considerations of international policy rather than of
56
international law.

The law governing the interpretation of Security Council resolutions is
not clear-cut, and it remains to be seen toward which, if any, direction
a degree of clarity evolves.
For the moment, the United States and Britain can rely on their purposive approach, if not to generate widespread legal agreement, at least to
help protect their actions against charges of illegitimacy. As in the 1999
Kosovo crisis, the wider compass of legitimacy may, in practical terms,
be considered more important than particular disputes about the law. 57 Yet
it is also possible that the United States is attempting to secure legal status for its preferred approach to the interpretation of Security Council
resolutions. If so, it has one significant advantage, in that the greater the
ambiguousness of a rule, the more scope power and influence will have to
affect its application. 58 In this instance, the interpretation of any given
resolution will turn on its language and the factual circumstances surrounding its adoption and implementation-as those various factors are
assessed by individual states and groups of states. And the ability of the
powerful to influence these assessments could be considerable. Over
time, the United States could thus, potentially, secure sufficient acquiescence to the application of its preferred approach-to change, or at least
stretch, the interpretive rules. The only way to guarantee that this does not
happen would be for the Council to ensure that the language of all its resolutions was clear and precise. And in many circumstances this will not
be politically feasible; instead, the choice-as in November 2002-will
be between an ambiguous resolution and no resolution at all.
It is also possible that different interpretive approaches-and the different conclusions to which they may lead---could be mutually sustainable.
As has already been explained, different legal conclusions can even deliberately be fostered, so as to avoid confrontation or otherwise preserve
equilibrium between states that are prepared, in the final analysis, to neither agree nor disagree. Contrary to the instincts of many lawyers, states
sometimes do adopt texts that are designed to "de-legalize" a situation.
That the members do so is entirely consistent with the fact that the
Security Council is a political body with considerable discretionary
power. Within the sphere of international peace and security, its lawmaking capacity is limited only by the ability of its members to agreeand, perhaps, by a handful of fundamental "peremptory rules" referred
to as jus cogens. 59 The Council can impose legal obligations on states
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and remove obligations from them. There is nothing in the Charter to
suggest that the Security Council lacks the capacity to adopt a resolution that is deliberately open to different interpretations.
Moreover, since such a resolution could, in certain circumstances,
cushion the impact of an otherwise unauthorized action on existing
rules and institutions, acknowledging this possibility hardly diminishes
the importance of international law and international lawyers. Instead,
recognizing that legal texts and those who draft them can play this additional role-protecting the international system from permanent harm
during the more politically charged moments of international affairsbuttresses one of the key conclusions of interdisciplinary work at the
interface of international law and international relations. Since international law both reflects and constrains politics, power, and now the
long-term impact of political convulsions on the international legal system, acknowledging the political underpinnings of the law does not
60
negate the inherent specificity of its rules.
All that said, attempts at de-legalizing a particular situation could
be undermined by subsequent events. In the aftermath of the Iraq war,
the failure of U.S.-led weapons inspectors to find evidence that Saddam
Hussein posed an imminent threat has weakened the claim, not that
Resolution 1441 provided authorization, but that any such authorization
was relied upon appropriately by the United States and Britain. Similarly, the ongoing reluctance of many states to support the U.S.-led
occupation of Iraq confirms that Washington and London's interpretation of Resolution 1441 (and its antecedents) was not widely shared.
Moreover, it seems that other states are currently exercising even more
caution with respect to the language of new Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003, was very tightly
worded so as to leave little scope for arguments that it provided ex post
facto authorization of the war. 61 The same is true of Resolution 1511,
adopted on 16 October 2003, even though this last resolution did
authorize a U.S.-led multilateral force to provide "security and stability" in Iraq. 62 Intentional ambiguity is not a panacea; it is a legal safety
valve that helps to buy time, in the hope that the problems giving rise to
its deployment can be addressed later, in circumstances more favorable
to the continued rule of law-and to real diplomatic agreement. 0
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